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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA B. 
WELCHMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
MERRILL J. WOOD, djbja Wood 
Realty Company, and MILO D. 
CARTER, 





Respondents respectfully :request the court to review 
the brief record, including appellants deposition, in this 
case to be advised of the fact situation that it might not 
suppose the "Statement of Facts" as recited in appellants' 
brief herein fully satisfies the case. 
Having received all proffer·ed evidence the trial 
court felt moved to say: "There was no real agreement 
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by way of parole-nothing that was not anticipated in 
the written agreement. Plaintiffs have indicated that 
there simply was 'puffing' talk." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 8th day of March, 1956, appellants 
entered into a Sales Agency Contract with the respon-
dent Merrill J. Wood d/b/a Wood Realty Company. (R 
pg 15 and 31 ) Said contract stated in part : "In con-
sideration of your agreement to list the property described 
on the reverse side of this contract with the Multiple 
Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board ... I 
hereby grant you ... the exclusive right to sell or ex-
change said property . . . if you find a buyer who is ready 
willing and able to buy or exchange said property . . . or 
if said property is sold or exchanged ... I agree to pay 
the commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board . . " 
Appellant deposes and says that the house so listed 
for sale or trade was in fact traded due to the efforts of 
respondents. ( Dep. pg 6, 7) Appellants lived in the house 
that they traded for, (Dep. pg 7) and traded the said 
listed house for the top listing price and received the 
equivalent of $5000 as a down payment. (Dep. pg 8, 9) 
The known and contractual sales commission was paid 
(Dep pg 11) with no protest and recognizing the same as 
a contractual obligation. (Dep. pg 12) Appellant de-
poses and says that to his knowledge there never was any 
other written contract than the above mentioned Sales 
Agency Contract. (Dep. pg 43) 
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During the period of time that said contract was 
being executed one of the appellants worked in the re-
spondent's real estate office as a licensed real estate sales-
man. (Dep. pg 18-19) 
There are numerous allegations by the appellants 
that respondents assisted appellants in many ways in 
appellant's various attempts to raise monies by mortgag-
ing their newly acquired home or selling the equity in 
the real estate contract that appellants retained on their 
original house. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their 
first cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the 
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 ( 5). 
2. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their 
second cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the 
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 ( 5) and the Utah Supreme Court's 
interpretation thereof. 
3. There is no evidence of record, which, when view-
ed in a light most favorable to appellants, indicates that 
there was any contract by way of parole agreement on 
any subject not anticipated in the written contract. 
4. There is no evidence of record that would estop 
the respondents from invoking the statute of frauds as 
a defense in the instant action. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their 
first cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the 
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 ( 5). 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
"25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. In the following cases every agree-
ment shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing sub-
scribed by the party to be charged therewith ... 
( 5) Every agreement authorized or employ-
ing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real 
estate for comp·ensation.'' 
It is the general rule, followed by the great weight of 
authority of the cases, that parties to a written agreement 
coming within the provisions of the statute of frauds 
may not, by mere oral agreement, modify or alter one or 
more of the terms thereof and make a new agreement 
resting partly in writing and partly in parole. For restate-
ment of this principle see: 27 C. J. 327; 25 C. C. L. 708; 
L. R. A. 191 7 B 14 7 (annotation) ; 1 7 A. L. R. 14 ( anno-
tation). 
The Utah Court has held specifically on this matter 
in the Combined Metals Inc. v. Bastian~ 71 U 535, 267 P 
1020. In this case Combined Metals contracted with 
Bastian. Bastian agreed to sell and deliver to plaintiff 335 
shares of Idaho State Bank for 850,000 shares of Com-
bined Metals Inc. stock. There was an alleged oral 
contract modifying the written agreement and the court 
ruled: 
"Again, the original contract to be binding and 
enforceable, and to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 
was required to be, as it was, in writing and sub-
scribed by the parties to be charged. To alter or 
modify any of its material parts or terms by a sub-
sequent agreement required one also to be in 
writing and so subscribed ... '' 
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In another Utah case where the portion quoted from 
the pleadings is substantially identical with the pleadings 
in the instant case the court said in Case v. Ralph, 56 U 
243, 188 p 640: 
"What the statute requires is that the employment 
or authority of the agent to sell or procure a pur-
chaser must be evidenced by an express agreement 
in writing ... (the fact that there was an allegation 
that there was) ... agreement to pay commission 
and that he was paid $375.00 by defendant are 
therefore wholly insufficient to meet the require-
ments of the statute. 
It is there alleged that 'at the special instance and 
request of said defendant this plaintiff did negot-
iate and was instrumental in securing . . . the 
value of said property and take and receive the 
said option to purchase'. All of these statements 
rna y be true . . . yet there is not an intimation even 
that what is all·eged was done by virtue of an ex-
press contract ... the allegations of the complaint 
are insufficient to state a cause of action for the 
reason that no express contract . . .is alleged." 
If all that the appellants allege in their alleged first 
cause of action were true there would be no actionable 
cause of action in the light of statute and case law. 
2. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their 
second cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the 
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 ( 5) and the Utah Supreme Court's 
interpretation thereof. 
Appellants' alleged second cause of action attempts 
to plead in equity. The question then must be resolved: 
equity to whom? The record testimony speaks for itself 
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largely through appellants own testimony. Every provi-
sion that the appellants contracted for was had. 
While we insist the better rule to be that a contract 
required by the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot 
be modified in any particular by a subsequent oral con-
tract, we also insist that the cases cited by the appellant 
are not in point for the reason that none of the theories 
upon which the cases were decided would apply to the 
case at bar. Consid.er Kerr v. Hillyard~ 51 U 364. Herein 
plaintiff contracted with the defendant to purchase a 
farm and as much included personal property as defend-
ant could for $7500.00. Plaintiff furnished defendant with 
the money. Defendant's commission was to be one haH 
of the personal property that was sold from the farm--not 
to exceed $300.00. Defendant got $850.00 worth of per-
sonal property with plaintiff's money, converting it to his 
own use and fraudulently withheld the knowledge of this 
secret profit from the plaintiff. Plaintiff sues for an 
accounting of the personal property because of the fraud-
ulent behavior of defendant and defendant defended say-
ing the original contract was oral and void under the 
Statute of Frauds. The court found that the defendant 
had wrongfully detained the property in excess of $300.00 
commission and gave judgement for the difference be-
tween the $300.00 and what the defendant actually 
bought with the plaintiff's money. The court stated: 
" ... plaintiff is not suing defendant to enforce 
a contract relating to the purchase of or sale of 
real property . . . When the agreement relative 
to the purchase of the farm had been fully exe-
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cuted, however, then there was no longer any 
legal obstacle in the way which would prevent 
the plaintiff from compelling the defendant to 
account for the personal property he had received 
... in excess of the $300.00, which was the amount 
of the compensation, all of which he had received 
and retained." 
As the words of the court suggest, this case is simply 
not is point. (a) There is no fraud nor claim of fraud 
in the instant case and such was the pivotal point in the 
cited case. (b) In the instant fact situation the alleged 
cause of action is based upon a sale or trade of real estate 
and the commision therefore. The cited case specifically 
and expressly was not such a situation, but was a suit for 
an accounting because of fraud. (c) In the instant case 
the original contract was in writing, satisfying the statute, 
and the parties acted in accordance with the contract. 
None of this was fact in the cited case. 
Appellants further cite the Utah case Bamberger Co. 
v. Certified Production, 88 U 194; 48 P2nd 489, a wholly 
dissimilar case wherein plaintiffs entered into a written 
lease letting property. They sued in equity for restitution 
of premises because premises had not been kept free from 
liens etc. as per lease. A defense was entered that there 
were oral agreements changing the lease. The court held : 
'If a party has changed his position by performing 
an oral modification so that it would be inequitable 
to permit the other party to found a claim upon 
the original agreement as unmodified or defeat 
the former's claim by setting up a defense that 
performance was not according to the written con-
tract, after he has induced or consented to the 
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other going foreward, the modified agreement 
should be held valid." 
In the pleading of the alleged second cause of action 
there is no allegation, nor has there been subsequent pre-
tended evidence, on the part of the appellants that they 
did anything that was different or that was not antici-
pated in the original written contract. There is no plead-
ing in the alleged equitable cause of action that appellants 
assumed a new position by virtue of the alleged oral 
modifications. Thus this case does not apply to the facts 
of the case at bar. 
The equity in the case at bar is clearly with the 
respondents, who, by appellants admission, performed 
the contracted for duties of procuring a trade for appell-
ants' house. Appellants were the beneficiaries and recip-
ients of said services of respondents and lived in the house 
thus acquired until after the commencement of this action. 
The court in the Bamberger Case, supra, went to 
lengths to assure the reader that it did not intend to 
write new law than the general rule above cited. As part 
of its ruling dictum the court controls the case at bar as 
follows: 
"The rule that there can be no oral modification 
of a contract required by the statute of frauds to 
be in writing has been most rigidly enforced in 
England . . . Most of the courts of this country 
hold, as a general rule, that an oral modification 
of a contract required by the statute of frauds to 
be in writing will not be permitted.'' 
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The narrow area of exception to this rule is carefully 
restricted in its application by this decision to fact sit-
uations other than the one at bar. 
3. There is no evidence of record, which, when view-
ed in a light most favorable to appellants, indicates that 
there was any contract by way of parole agreement on 
any subject not anticipated in the written contract. 
4. There is no evidence of record that would estop 
the respondents from invoking the Statute of Frauds as 
a defense in the instant action. 
Succumbing to the temptation of a scatter-gun 
attack, in the absence of a bona fide cause of action, 
appellants finally cry: "We also rely upon an equitable 
estoppel of respondent's assertion of the statute of frauds" 
and cite the Utah case Kelly v . . Richards, 95 U 560; 83 P 
2nd 731, as though the court in said case santioned this 
sort of straw grasping. Quite to the contrary, cited case 
deals the death blow to the appellants' contention. 
Therein the court says: 
"There can be no estoppel if either of these ele-
ments are wanting.' 
The court then names false representation as one 
of the essential elements and says: 
'The party on whom it (false representation) was 
made must have been without knowledge, or 
means of knowledge, of the material of the real 
facts." 
Appellants admit (Dep. pg 18-19) that one of the 
appellants was employed in the real estate office of re-
spondents during the instant transaction. Appellants 
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testify that they knew that the respondents were not in 
the money lending business (Dep. pg 27-27) and knew 
that respondents could not guarantee F. H. A. appraisals 
and knew that respondents were not F. H. A. appraisers 
nor guarantors of loans. Indeed the appellants made 
their own application for loans through others. 
31 Corpus Juris Secundum 288 cites the Kelly Case, 
supra, to illustrate the general rule: "To create an 
estoppel the representation relied on must be a statement 
of a material fact, and not an expression of opinion." 
Appellants had reason to know which of the alleged state-
ments were opinion and which were not. 
CONCLUSION 
If all that the appellants have said of record were 
true, and respondents deny that it is true, the lower 
court was correct in granting the motion for Summary 
Judgement and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Jr. 
of the firm 
McCONKIE & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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